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CAP Final §7 — Authorization & Control Model (Normative draft, Faying-aligned)

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Status: Drafted clause for H1-PROTO-01 (closes gaps G-1, G-8). This is the chapter that makes CAP a first-class Faying citizen: it defines the composite control decision, binds CAP to a live Faying Mandate, maps Faying grades G0–G4 onto terminal control authority, and lands the Emergency-Override and downgrade-monotonicity behaviors at the terminal. Style: hard constraints carry IDs C-<area>-<n> and Trace: R<n>.<m>.<k> to the requirements baseline (02). Mirrors Faying-Protocol-1.0 §2.3 / §7. Authority: CAP consumes the Faying grade and presence semantics (Faying owns them per the authoritative-source-map); this chapter specifies only how the CAP terminal enforces them on terminal resources.

7.1 The composite control decision

The CAP terminal grants control on a single AuthRequest only when every predicate below holds, evaluated in order; failure at any predicate is a Default-Deny rejection with the corresponding error code (§11). This is the CAP analog of Faying's "four-element verification gate".

GRANT  ⟺  P1 credential-valid          (§9.1 7-step validation)
        ∧ P2 mandate-bound-and-live     (C-Bind-1)
        ∧ P3 grade-sufficient           (C-Grade-1)
        ∧ P4 presence-fresh-for-grade   (C-Grade-2)
        ∧ P5 rwlock-compatible          (§7.5 matrix)
        ∧ P6 constraints-satisfied      (§9 constraints)
        ∧ P7 operation-criticality-gate (§8 / C-Grade-4)

C-Stack-1 (every operation passes the CAP gate): The CAP terminal SHALL NOT permit any Fay-originated operation on a Terminal_Resource to bypass predicates P1–P7; any operation reaching the OS access-control layer without a passing CAP decision SHALL be treated as a rogue action and rejected.
- Trace: R2.1, R2.3.

7.2 Mandate binding (CAP as a Faying Relying Party)

C-Bind-1 (bound, live Mandate required): WHEN evaluating P2, the CAP terminal SHALL require a verifiable binding (mandate_ref) to a Faying Mandate that is currently Active (or Disconnected under a valid endorsement, per Faying §7.5); IF absent, expired, or unverifiable, THEN reject with E_MANDATE_MISSING / E_MANDATE_INVALID.
- Trace: R1.2, R1.3.
C-Bind-2 (single accountability endpoint): The CAP terminal SHALL confirm the bound Mandate's attestation chain resolves to exactly one Human Prime / Official_Post; IF multiple or none, THEN reject (E_MANDATE_INVALID) and write to audit.
- Trace: R1.1, R1.3.
C-Bind-3 (scope convergence): The granted_modes the CAP terminal derives from a matched Grant SHALL be a subset of the bound Mandate's scope; the CAP terminal SHALL NOT grant any mode/operation outside the Mandate scope even if the local credential would allow it.
- Trace: R13.4.
C-Bind-4 (revocation enforcement): WHEN the bound Mandate becomes Revoked (any RevokeReason), the CAP terminal SHALL terminate every Session referencing it and reject new requests bound to it (E_MANDATE_REVOKED).
- Trace: R4.5, R8.3.

[需人类决策 D-1] — the exact binding model. Three candidate models; this draft is written to be correct under any of them, but the data-model fields and conformance vectors depend on the choice:

Model How mandate_ref binds Pros Cons
A. Derivation — the Authorization_Descriptor is issued under a Faying Mandate (the Mandate's scope includes terminal-resource grants; the descriptor is a projection signed within the attestation chain) Single source of truth; revocation cascades naturally Couples issuance tightly; offline issuance flow must carry chain
B. Reference + live check (recommended) — descriptors stay CAP-native but each AuthRequest carries a mandate_ref the CAP terminal validates against Faying (live or cached-with-staleness) Clean separation; reuses existing CAP issuance; offline-friendly with cached attestation Two artifacts to keep consistent
C. Embedded grade only — the descriptor embeds faying_grade + presence requirement but no live Mandate check Simplest offline Weakest accountability; grade can go stale; not symmetric-revocable

Recommendation: B, with A as the issuance ideal for high-criticality resources, and C explicitly disallowed for any high/critical operation. Requires cross-repo coordination with faying-protocol and fayger (multi-repo-coordination: a CAP openspec/change + linked Faying/FayGer follow-ups).

7.3 Mapping Faying G0–G4 → CAP control authority

CAP does not invent grades; it states, per grade, the maximum access modes and operation criticalities a Fay may exercise on terminal resources. This is the default mapping; a Grant.min_grade or a Resource Capability Descriptor MAY require a stricter grade (never looser).

Faying grade	Presence basis (Faying App. B)	Max access modes (default)	Max operation criticality (default)	Typical CAP use
G4 Autonomous	heartbeat ≤ 30 min	`read`; `execute`/`write` only for `routine`	`routine`	Sensor reads, log tailing, idempotent low-risk automation
G3 Loose	intent-ticket at key steps	`read`, `write`, `execute`	`sensitive`	Email/calendar actions, reversible writes
G2 Moderate	≤ 60 s before sensitive subtask	`read`, `write`, `execute`, `configure` (reversible)	`high` (with confirmation per §8)	Booking, form submission, hard-to-reverse but recoverable ops
G1 Strict	≤ 5 s continuous	all modes incl. high-privilege `configure`	`critical` (with per-operation confirmation per §8)	Irreversible / safety / life-critical actuation
G0 Emergency Override	N/A (HP-only)	— (no Fay operations)	—	HP reclaims control; all Fay sessions suspended

C-Grade-1 (grade floor): The CAP terminal SHALL reject an AuthRequest whose matched Grant.min_grade, or whose requested operation's required grade per the mapping above and §8, is stricter than the bound Mandate's effective grade (E_GRADE_INSUFFICIENT).
- Trace: R4.1.
C-Grade-2 (presence freshness per grade): The CAP terminal SHALL require a presence proof no staler than the bound grade's max_staleness_ms; IF stale, THEN reject the operation (E_PRESENCE_STALE) and apply C-Grade-3.
- Trace: R4.2, R12.5.
C-Grade-4 (criticality dominates grade): The grade mapping above is a ceiling, not a license; the operation-criticality gate in §8 SHALL additionally apply. A high grade SHALL NOT exempt a critical operation from per-operation confirmation.
- Trace: R5.2, R5.8.

[需人类决策 D-2] — the default mode×grade×criticality matrix above. The cells are a defensible starting point but are a policy choice with safety consequences (e.g., "may G2 ever perform a critical op with confirmation, or is critical strictly G1-only?"). This draft fixes critical ⇒ G1-only (see §8, R5.2) and leaves the high-class grade floor (G2 vs G1) as [需人类决策 D-6].

7.4 Downgrade monotonicity at the terminal ("without presence, stricter")

Mirrors Faying §7.3. Presence loss narrows the human's view, so CAP MUST tighten, never loosen.

C-Grade-3 (presence-loss tightening): WHEN the bound Mandate's presence becomes stale for the current grade, the CAP terminal SHALL, for each active Session of that Fay: (a) immediately reject any pending high/critical operation; (b) suspend the Session if its access mode/criticality is no longer permitted at the degraded effective grade; (c) SHALL NOT raise the permitted criticality or modes under any circumstance.
- Trace: R4.2, R7.3.
C-Grade-5 (no runtime escalation): The CAP terminal SHALL NOT provide any interface that elevates a live Session's effective grade or granted_modes; a higher grade/mode requires a new AuthRequest bound to a fresh Mandate.
- Trace: R4.4.

7.5 Emergency Override (G0) at the terminal

G0 is orthogonal to G1–G4 (Faying §7): it is not "a stricter tier" but the channel by which the Human Prime instantly reclaims control. CAP is the terminal-side enforcement endpoint.

C-G0-1 (immediate reclamation): WHEN the CAP terminal receives a verified Faying G0 Emergency Override targeting a Fay (directly or via the Revocation Registry push), it SHALL, atomically and at the highest priority over any queued event: (a) terminate all of that Fay's active Sessions on the terminal (reason emergency_override); (b) revoke their OS access; (c) refuse new AuthRequests from that Fay until a fresh Mandate is bootstrapped; (d) where the controlled resource supports a defined safe state, request the driver to enter it; (e) lock control to human.
- Trace: R4.3.
C-G0-2 (HP-only, non-forgeable): The CAP terminal SHALL accept a G0 only when it carries a verifiable Human-Prime witness (or an authority/regulator signature per Faying RevokeReason); a G0 purportedly self-initiated by a Fay / runtime SHALL be rejected (E_PROTOCOL) and audited.
- Trace: R4.3, R10.1.
C-G0-3 (no endorsement shelter): WHILE a G0 is in effect for a Fay, the CAP terminal SHALL NOT honor any offline-endorsement autonomy for that Fay (parity with Faying's G0 ⟂ endorsement mutual exclusion).
- Trace: R4.3.

[需人类决策 D-3] — the safe-state obligation (C-G0-1(d)). Whether CAP mandates a driver "safe state" on G0 (e.g., drone → hover/return-to-home, infusion pump → hold-at-current-rate, vehicle → controlled-stop) or merely terminates control is safety-critical and resource-class-specific. This draft requires "request safe state where the resource supports a defined safe state"; the catalog of safe states and whether absence-of-safe-state blocks G0 takeover requires human/domain review.

7.6 Interaction with revocation, sessions, and handover

C-Map-1 (Mandate-state ↔ Session-state coupling): The CAP terminal SHALL terminate or suspend Sessions in response to bound-Mandate transitions as follows: Revoked → terminate (C-Bind-4); Suspended (incl. G0) → terminate (C-G0-1); presence-stale/Degraded → tighten (C-Grade-3).
- Trace: R4.5, R7.3.
C-Map-2 (handover inherits the gate): WHEN control is handed to a target Fay or to human, the CAP terminal SHALL re-evaluate P1–P7 for the target; a handover SHALL NOT transfer a grade/criticality the target's bound Mandate does not satisfy, and a Fay-to-Human handover of high/critical control SHALL apply the §8 confirmation gate.
- Trace: R6.3, R4.1.

7.7 Summary of hard constraints (this chapter)

ID	One-line	Trace
C-Stack-1	No operation bypasses the CAP gate	R2.1, R2.3
C-Bind-1	Bound, live Mandate required	R1.2, R1.3
C-Bind-2	Single accountability endpoint	R1.1, R1.3
C-Bind-3	Granted modes ⊆ Mandate scope	R13.4
C-Bind-4	Mandate revoked → kill sessions	R4.5, R8.3
C-Grade-1	Grade floor enforced	R4.1
C-Grade-2	Presence freshness per grade	R4.2, R12.5
C-Grade-3	Presence-loss tightening (monotonic)	R4.2, R7.3
C-Grade-4	Criticality dominates grade	R5.2, R5.8
C-Grade-5	No runtime escalation	R4.4
C-G0-1	G0 → immediate reclamation	R4.3
C-G0-2	G0 is HP-only, non-forgeable	R4.3, R10.1
C-G0-3	No endorsement shelter under G0	R4.3
C-Map-1	Mandate-state ↔ session-state coupling	R4.5, R7.3
C-Map-2	Handover inherits the gate	R6.3, R4.1

Changelog

(draft) Initial Faying-aligned control model, H1-PROTO-01.

Model	How `mandate_ref` binds	Pros
A. Derivation — the `Authorization_Descriptor` is issued under a Faying Mandate (the Mandate's scope includes terminal-resource grants; the descriptor is a projection signed within the attestation chain)	Single source of truth; revocation cascades naturally	Couples issuance tightly; offline issuance flow must carry chain
B. Reference + live check (recommended) — descriptors stay CAP-native but each `AuthRequest` carries a `mandate_ref` the CAP terminal validates against Faying (live or cached-with-staleness)	Clean separation; reuses existing CAP issuance; offline-friendly with cached attestation	Two artifacts to keep consistent
C. Embedded grade only — the descriptor embeds `faying_grade` + presence requirement but no live Mandate check	Simplest offline	Weakest accountability; grade can go stale; not symmetric-revocable